INTRODUCTION
The production and aggregation of information as a result of the trading process is one of the core functions of financial markets (Kyle, 1985) . This implies that financial markets have an effect on the real economy and are not just a sidesshow (Bond et al., 2012) . The basic idea is that stock prices may contain certain information that managers do not have, and they can learn from this information about the prospects of their own firms. This private information refers in particular to the external environment of the firm and may relate to the competitive environment in which it operates, the implications of past decisions of the firm's managers, and the firm's investment opportunities. Pricing private information will guide managers in making corporate decisions, such as the decision on corporate investments. This idea is supported by the theories developed by Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and the empirical results obtained by Durnev et al. (2004) ; Chen et al. (2007) , Bakke and Whited (2010) , or Fressard (2012) .
The reflection of private information in stock prices or price informativeness differs from one market to another. Mork et al. (2000) propose a set of factors explaining these differences, and recently Nguyen and Truong (2013) and Eun et al. (2015) have added to this list certain dimensions of culture, such as individualism, tightness and uncertainty avoidance. Both studies use stock price synchronicity as a proxy for price informativeness. measures the relative amount of market-wide information versus firm-specific information impounded into stock price, thus being an inverse measure of stock price informativeness. Despite being the most popular measure of price informativeness, it is highly controversial in recent literature. First, it is not clear whether price synchronicity reflects informativeness or noise traders (Teoh et al., 2009; Chan and Chan, 2014) or whether it is a direct or an inverse measure (Dasgupta et al., 2010; Kan and Gong, 2017) . Second, stocks with low should have those features that facilitate the incorporation of private information into stock prices, such as fewer impediments to arbitrage and lower information costs. On the contrary, Kelly (2014) shows that low stock are infrequently traded, small and with high bid-ask spreads and high price impact. Third, captures firm-specific information, which is a wider information set that actually includes private information. But business managers are only interested in private information in substantiating their decisions.
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the incorporation of private information into stock prices and two of the culture dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2010) , namely individualism / collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. The originality of the empirical approach is given by the use of the information measure of Llorente et al. (2002) . By construction, this measure has the potential to capture more accurately the incorporation of private information into stock prices. The main contribution of this study is given by the validation or invalidation of the conclusions obtained by Nguyen and Truong (2013) and Eun et al. (2015) , using an alternative measure of stock price informativenesswhich is less exposed to criticisms.
CULTURE AND STOCK PRICE INFORMATIVENESS
An accepted definition of culture is provided by Hofstede (1980) , according to which 'culture is a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes members of one human group from another'. Different dimensions of culture explain the values of a particular culture and its effects on the organization, workplace and investors' behavior.
The role of culture in the development and functioning of capital markets is widely evidenced in literature. Weber (1930) is among the first to claim that in certain cultures, financial markets have a better development environment than others. More recently, Lal (1999) considers that certain dimensions of culture have led to a more pronounced development of economies and stock markets in Western economies. Empirically, the association between different dimensions of culture and the development of financial markets is highlighted by Dutta and Mukherjee (2012) . Other studies highlight the impact of culture on some variables that characterize the way stock markets operate. Different dimensions of culture influence the links between stock markets (Lucey and Zhang, 2010; Beugelsdijk et al., 2010), commonality in liquidity (Moshirian et al., 2017) or stock market volatility (Zheng, 2015) .
Individualism / collectivism represents one of the six cultural dimensions analyzed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and, according to the studies of Nguyen and Truong (2013) and Eun et al. (2015) , may be the most important cultural factor that determines the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. Specifically, they have shown that firm-specific information content of stock prices is higher in individualistic countries and lower in collectivistic ones. Acting on personal behalf, rather than fulfilling the groups' interests, individualistic investors exhibit superior capacities to gather and analyze firm-specific information. The review of literature by Nguyen and Truong (2013) show that individualistic investors are prone to overconfidence, self-attribution biases and also have high preference for risk. These features of individualistic investors, in conjunction with a series of behavioral models from literature, theoretically support the possibility that, in more individualistic (less collectivistic) nations, firm-specific information is more substantially incorporated into stock prices.
Uncertainty avoidance is the fourth dimension of culture analyzed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and according to Nguyen and Truong (2013) is inversely correlated with firm-specific information incorporated into stock prices. This dimension refers to the amount of anxiety people have regarding the unknown or ambiguous outcomes. People from more uncertainty-avoiding cultures are more conservative, have a stronger risk aversion and prefer formally structured activities. In their societies, the institutions impose more rules. On the contrary, people from less uncertainty-avoiding cultures prefer more flexible rules, informal activities, and are more open to change and innovation. The theoretical arguments of Nguyen and Truong (2013) This measure starts from the premise that investors are analyzing the trading volumes that provide information on the future stock price. By dividing investors into two categories, those performing hedging operations and speculators based on private information, it is assumed that there will be different dynamics of the stock price. Thus, speculative trades generated positive autocorrelations of returns while hedging trades generate negative autocorrelations.
For each firm-year from the time-series regression we estimate the annual amount of private trading information from the model:
where is the return of stock of country and is the log daily turnover of stock detrended by substracting a 200 trading day moving average. Higher values of denote more information-based trading incorporated in stock prices. The intuition behind this interpretation is that in periods of high volume, stocks with a high degree of information-based trading tend to display positive returnautocorrelation. Our dependent variable is an equally weighted average of the of the individual stocks in country .
Independent variables
The independent variables of interest are individualism and uncertainty indexes provided by Hofstede (2010) . They take values in the range 0-100 and are time invariant. In order to ensure the comparability of our results with those obtained by Eun et al. (2015) we selected the following control variables. For information opaqueness we have chosen a measure of the intensity of analyst activity following Chan and Hameed (2006) . This is the number of analysts who issued earnings forecasts for a company during a calendar year. The variable is determined for each country-year as the average of the number of analysts. The data are extracted from I/B/E/S International, taking into account only constituents of the stock market indexes. The good government index is determined annually as the sum of the percentile ranks of government effectiveness index and control of corruption index from World Bank database.
We control for economic and financial development with Ln(GDP per capita) and Ln(number of stocks). For macroeconomic instability we use GDP growth volatility measured by sample variance of the annual GDP per capita growth using a five-year moving window followingFernandes and Ferreira (2009). Another structural variable included is Ln(country size)which is log of geographical size in square kilometers for each country. Industrial concentration (Ind. Herfindahl index) and firm concentration (Firm Herfindahl index) are measured by Herfindalindexes determined from the annual sales of all listed companies on the markets under study.
THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The study includes 23 stock markets which, according to the Morgan Stanley classification, are classified as developed. We have built a balanced panel over a 14 year sample period, from January 2004 to December 2016. We restricted the sample to developed markets only for two reasons. First, the estimates for the various measures of stock price informativeness can be biased when stocks are illiquid, which is especially true for the developing markets. Second, differences in cross-section on stock price informativeness between developed and developing markets could lead to an easy acceptance of the study assumptions. In this study we are also interested in whether the conclusions obtained by Eun et al. (2015) , on a sample of 47 countries remain valid on a more homogeneous sample formed exclusively from developed markets. In the first stage we selected all listed stocks on these markets during the period 2004-2014. Of these, only those that have been listed in at least 80% of the stock exchange sessions of each year have been retained in the final sample. We extract daily and weekly closing prices, as well as their daily trading volumes, weekly prices for each local stock market index and MSCI World index. All data denominated in dollars is obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To test the relation between culture and stock price informativeness, we estimate several specifications of the following model: 
Culture and stock price synchronicity
Following Mork et al. (2000), we estimate annually for each stock the following model:
where is the weekly return of stock of country in week ; and are the weekly local/global market return in week . Price synchronicity is the coefficient of determination . A high indicates that less firm specific information is impounded into stock price and thus the stock price is less informative. Given the cross-country nature of this study, we use an equally weighted average of the s of the individual stocks in country . The dependent variable is a logistic transformation of , respectively:
Even in the case of developed stock markets, lowstocks are small, young, and covered by few analysts (Kelly, 2014). For this reason,we measured separately stock price synchronicity includingonly constituents of the stock market indexes which were continuously traded during the study period. Table 2 provides the estimation results ofseveral regressions between price synchronicity and culture.Thus, in models (1), (3), (5) and (7), is determined based on all the stocks in the sample, while in models (2), (4), (6) and (8) (2015) we expect the Individualism parameter to be negative and the UAI parameter to be positive. For the other dimension of culture, UAI, the positive sign of the coefficient is found only in model (4) where is determined on the basis of the constituent stocks. In models (5) - (8) we re-evaluated the parameters including the dimensions of culture.In models (1) and (2) the coefficients of the individualism variable are negative and statistically significant at 1% level. In models (5)- (8) we reestimate the parameters including dimensions of culture. To mitigate the effect of possible multicollinearity between individualism and UAI, we create an orthogonal variant of individualism (UAI) by regressing individualism (UAI) on UAI (individualism) and replacing individualism (UAI) in models (5)- (8) with the residual from these regressions.The signs of the coefficients indicate that the results do not change qualitatively even in this case.
Culture and private information
Specific information also includes private information, but it is a wider information set targeting the company. According to the theories developed by Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , managers learn from the price of their own actions when it incorporates particular private information that they do not know. To investigate the relationship between the two dimensions of culture and the incorporation of private information into stock prices we used as a dependent variable the information measure of Llorente et al. (2002) .
In models (1) and (2) of Table 3 we studied the relationship between information measure ( ) and the two dimensions of culture without introducing the control variables. The sign of the parameters indicates a direct link for individualism and an inverse one for the UAI at 1% significance level. The introduction of control variables in models (3) and (4), as well as the simultaneous presence of the two dimensions of culture in models (5) and (6), lead to similar qualitative results.
The results indicate that in more individualistic societies investors incorporate more private information into stock prices than in collectivistic societies. Individualists tend to analyze titles individually, while collectivistic investors are more likely to have holistic thinking and tend to analyze the stocks jointly (Todea and Buglea, 2017) . At the same time, more uncertainty-avoiding cultures incorporate less private information into stock prices. Conservatism, aversion to higher risk, and rigid rules are features of these societies that may inhibit certain privateinformations-based transactions. Note: Standard errors are double clustered at country and year levels, as in Thompson (2011) . T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Note: Standard errors are double clustered at country and year levels, as in Thompson (2011) . T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Openness, culture and private information
According to Eun et al. (2015) financial openness diminishes the relationship between culture and stock price synchronicity because of the transactions on domestic markets of foreign investors belonging to different cultures. For financial openness we construct the total value of portfolio equity holdings by foreign investors divided by country's stock market capitalization. The cross-border portfolio investment holdings in equity securities are obtained from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide. Although the relationship is weak, the positive sign of the Openness parameter in Models (1) and (2) of Table 4 indicates that the presence of foreign investors on domestic markets facilitates the incorporation of private information into stock prices. Interesting are the results obtained in models (3) - (6), where the parameter of Individualism × Openness is positive and the parameter of UAI × Openness is negative. These results differ from those obtained by Eun et al. (2015) and show that financial openness is a stimulating factor of price informativenessindividualism relationship and an inhibitor of price informativeness -UAI relationship. In a highly globalized world, individualistic investors take advantage of financial openness and incorporate more private information in price than collectivists. On the contrary, greater anxiety and higher aversion to risk of more uncertainty-avoiding cultures may be more pronounced when financial openness generates higheruncertainty in domestic markets.
CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between the incorporation of specific information into stock prices and different dimensions of culture, such as individualism/collectivism or uncertainty avoidance, has recently been highlighted in the literature by Nguyen and Truong (2013) and Eun et al. (2015) . This study starts from the premise that private information is that part of the specific information that companies' managers are particularly interested in. Therefore, the study objective was to reinvestigate the relationship using a more appropriate measure of private information incorporation into stock prices than stock price synchronicity, such as the information measure of Llorente et al. (2002) .
The empirical results shed light on three researched aspects.First, we reinvestigated and validated the relationship between stock price synchronicity and the two dimensions of culture on a more homogeneous sample of developed markets only. We have thus tried to take into account the criticisms in the literature on the inadequacy of the price synchronicity measure in case of developing markets that are illiquid. Second, we validated the hypotheses of the study according to which more private information is incorporated into individualist societies and less in uncertainty avoiding societies. Finally, we showed that financial openness is a stimulating factor of price informativeness-individualism relationship and an inhibitor of price informativeness -uncertainty avoidance relationship.
